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Recent Developments
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
OF THE SEA: A SYNOPSIS
IhTODUCTIOI
As a part of its annual symposium on the law of the sea, the
San Diego Law Review compiles a summary of significant recent
developments in the field. This seventh annual synopsis reports
major events which occurred between January 1, 1975, and Decem-
ber 31, 1975. Scope, format, and approach are substantially as
employed in the past; a minor change is the extended use of foot-
notes, including citations to newspapers. The synopsis begins with
a report on the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea, which held its third session at Geneva in the spring of
1975. Following this discussion, the developments are presented
under these subject headings: Conservation, Fishing, Pollution and
Pollution Control, Seabed Resources, Shipping, and Sovereignty.
Information was primarily derived from the Congressional Record,
the Department of State Bulletin, the EnviTonment Reporter,
International Legal Materials, local newspapers, the New York
Times, the United Nations Monthly Chronicle, U.S. Code Congres-
sional and Administrative News, the Wall Street Journal, and the
Weekly Law Digest.
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UNITED NATIONS LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE
The second substantive session of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea was held in Geneva from March
17 to May 9, 1975. The delegations from 148 nations faced issues
left unresolved at the close of the first substantive session in Cara-
cas in 1974.1 The subjects were allocated among -three Committees
which operated at formal and informal levels. John Norton Moore,
of the United States delegation, cited as the session's greatest prod-
uct the "Informal Single Negotiating Text" (hereinafter referred to
as the Text) of draft treaty articles prepared by the Committee
chairmen which would serve as a basis for future negotiations.
2
The First Committee was concerned with a system for managing
the exploration and exploitation of resources of the deep seabed
beyond national jurisdiction, consistent with the principle that
those resources are the common heritage of mankind. The primary
exploitation contemplated is the mining of "manganese nodules,"
for which several international consortia may become operational
within the next decade. The area richest in these nodules is the
Central East-Pacific.3 To manage this exploration and exploitation,
most States agreed that an "International Sea-Bed Authority"
should be established, but widely different views were held as to
the nature of its operation. The U.S.S.R., for example, proposed
that the individual States would act under contract with this
Authority. Each State would have available to it a limited and
equal number of contracts. 4 Whereas many developing countries
felt that their interests would best be protected if the Authority
alone were allowed to exploit the resources directly, the United
States held to the view that because of the urgent need for raw
materials and the large investment required to mine them, it could
not "agree to give ultimate powers of exclusive exploitation to a
1. San Diego Union, March 16, 1975, § A, at 2, col. 6. See Recent De-
velopments in the Law of the Sea: A Synopsis, 12 S x DIEGo L. REv. 665,
666 (1975).
2. 6 BNA ENvm. REP. CuRRENT DEVELOPMENTS 212 (1975). The Informal
Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Pts. I-III, is repro-
duced at 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERmLs 682 (1975).
3. San Diego Union, March 17, 1975, § A, at 2, col 6.
4. Evening Tribune (San Diego), March 26, 1975, § A, at 14, col. 1.
single new international entity."' On August 11, 1975 Secretary of
State Kissinger explained that the United States would agree to
a policy under which the Authority could directly exploit significant
areas of the deep seabed, primarily for the benefit of developing
nations. Under this plan, all States also could independently ex-
ploit such resources, giving part of the income to the Authority
for the developing countries' benefit.6
The Text produced by the chairman of the First Committee
recognized that any exploitation done in the area should benefit
all States, whether coastal or land-locked. It provided that the
Authority would control all aspects of deep-sea mining and that
States could mine under contract or in joint venture with it. The
Text proposed that the Authority have its seat in Jamaica, and
suggested its structure and composition. 7
The Second Committee dealt generally with the nature and
extent of the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone.
There had been wide agreement after Caracas upon a 12-mile limit
for the territorial sea.8 An extension from the traditional three
miles to 12 would encompass over 100 more straits,9 some of the
more significant being Magellan, Malacca, and Gibraltar. For this
reason, the United States,10 the U.S.S.R.," and others have con-
ditioned acceptance of a 12-mile limit upon a guarantee of unim-
peded transit and overflight through the straits. Although none
of the Second Committee's groups had finished its work at the close
of the session, the chairman produced a draft of articles which set
12 miles as a maximum for the territorial sea. 12 Although the
5. 72 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 783, 785 (1975).
6. 73 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 353, 357 (1975). For a United States proposal
which would effectuate this policy by reserving 50 percent of the interna-
tional area to be exploited at the discretion of the Authority, whereas the
remaining 50 percent could be exploited almost automatically upon fulfill-
ment of treaty provisions, see the statement of Leigh S. Ratiner, Adminis-
trator, Oceans Mining Admin., Dept. of the Interior, in Hearings on Law
of the Sea Before the Senate Subcomm. on Oceans and International Envi-
ronment of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at
17 (1975).
7. 12 U.N. MoNTHLY CHRON., June, 1975, at 18-19.
8. The current claims of the 119 coastal States vary: 25 claim three
miles, 54 claim 12, and eight claim 200, with the rest in between. Prina,
Law of Sea Talks Try to Quel Ocean Disputes, San Diego Union, March
2, 1975, § C, at 1, col. 4. Equador stood firm on its 200-mile territorial claim
throughout the session. Farina, Threat to Tuna Fishing Arises at Sea Law
Talks, Evening Tribune (San Diego), May 14, 1975; § A, at 23, col. 2.
9. San Diego Union, March 23, 1975, § A, at 6, col. 3.
10. Prina, supra note 8.
11. Newsom, It Could Be Now or Never for "Law of the Sea," Evening
Tribune (San Diego), March 20, 1975, § B, at 2, col. 6.
12. U.N. MoNTmY CHRoN., supra note 7, at 20.
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Text did not significantly modify the doctrine of innocent passage,
its inclusion of the right of free transit is viewed as a significant
concession to the maritime States' insistence upon such a right.
The Text also recognized the concept of the exclusive economic
zone, setting its maximum limits at 200 miles. Within this zone,
the coastal State would have sovereign rights with regard to ex-
ploration, conservation, and exploitation of living and nonliving
resources. Coastal States were encouraged to allow foreign States
to take fish within the allowable catch beyond the coastal State's
fishing capacity, subject to coastal State regulation consistent with
the convention. The Text encouraged coastal States to share ex-
ploitation of living resources in this zone with land-locked States,
with the limitation that developed land-lock States could only look
to the resources in waters off developed neighboring States. No
agreement was reached at the session on the problem of fishing for
migratory species, such as tuna. The United States feels that such
fishing should be regulated not by the coastal States, but by a re-
gional or international authority. Mexico's view is typical of de-
veloping countries; when such fish enter its 200-mile offshore zone,
they become a Mexican coastal resource. 13 The Text subjected fish-
ing for migratory species to coastal State control. The Text further
proposed that the economic zone extend to the edge of the conti-
nental shelf in those areas where the shelf extended beyond 200
miles, for purposes of shelf resource exploitation. This extension
was a prime concern of -the United States, Canada, and Australia. 14
However, the Text required the coastal States to share the proceeds
from exploitation of resources in the area beyond 200 miles, making
payments to the Authority.
The work of the Third Committee involved protection of the
marine environment and scientific research. The draft articles
prepared by the chairman urged States to protect other States from
damage caused by pollution where it originated within the first
State's jurisdiction or where the State became aware of a danger
and it was likely another would be affected. States were also
required to regulate activities on a national level so as to minimize
13. Murphy, 200-Mile Offshore Claim Being Pushed by Mexico, San
Diego Union, March 30, 1975, § B, at 1, col. 3.
14. Lewis, Hope for Accord Seen at Sea Law Talks, N.Y. Times, March
31, 1975, at 2, col. 6.
onshore-source pollution and pollution from ocean dumping.1"
The United States seeks to restrict coastal State authority over
vessel-source pollution within the zone, fearing that differing
national standards may endanger freedom of navigation. 10 The
Text appeared to accommodate this view. On the issue of scientific
research, the Text gave exclusive rights to engage in such activities
within the territorial sea to the coastal State. Within the economic
zone, other States or international organizations may perform scien-
tific research, but must supply the coastal State with detailed
descriptions and must allow participation. Sharing of technology
was, of course, encouraged. While the United States desires that
there be little restriction placed upon scientific research, 17 the
developing world fears too much freedom will increase the tech-
nology gap between it and developed States.
While the Text presented by the Committee chairmen does not
represent consensus among delegations, it is to guide negotiations
when the next session convenes in New York on March 29, 1976.
Conference President H.S. Amerasinghe said the Geneva session,
could not be called a success because of its failure to reach agree-
ment.'8 (The 1973 General Assembly, discussing a Law of the Sea
'Conference, had contemplated adoption of a convention by the end
of 1975,19 and hopes were high after Caracas that it could be
obtained at Geneva.) Yet neither could he call it a failure, since
negotiations were to continue. John R. Stevenson, Chief of the
United States delegation, felt that there had been "progress, and
in some cases, substantial progress, on filling in with specific
articles the outlines of a treaty."20 He also expected the Informal
Single Negotiating Text to speed agreement.
CONSERVATION
IATTC Fails to Reach Agreement on the 1976 Eastern Pacific
Yellowfin Tuna Quota: On October 28, 1975, delegates to an eight-
nation meeting of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission
(IATTC) in Paris failed to reach agreement on the 1976 tuna fish-
ing quota for the Eastern Pacific Ocean. 21 The IATTC annually
sets the tonnage quota f6r the five million square mile yellowfin
15. 12 U.N. MoNmmY CHRoN., supra note 7, at 21.
16. Prina, supra note 8, at 5, col. 4.
17. 72 DEP'T STATE BULL. 783, 785 (1975).
18. N.Y. Times, May 10, 1975, at 4, col. 5.
19. Prina, supra note 8, at 5, col 5.
20. 72 DEP'T STATE BULL. 783 (1975).
21. San Diego Union, Oct. 28, 1975, § B, at 3, col. 1.
[VOL. 13: 628, 1976] Recent Developments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
conservation zone that stretches from mid-California to northern
Chile.
Dr. James Joseph, director of the IATTC, recommended that the
quota initially be set at 140,000 tons which could be raised a maxi-
mum of five times in increments of 10,000 tons. The quota would
be raised if it was apparent that the zone would not reach its maxi-
mum sustainable yield.22 Last year's quota was set at 175,000 tons
with two 10,000-ton increases at the insistence of several govern-
ments which were in the process of increasing the size of their tuna
fleets.2 3
The Commission also drafted a resolution recommending that
member nations take steps to equalize surveillance and enforcement
measures. Currently, the United States is the only country that
regularly enforces the IATTC's recommendations.
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Sets New Catch Levels: The International Commission for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) unanimously approved new
fishing quotas for the Northwest Atlantic on September 28, 1975.
The new agreement reduces the total 1976 catch from 797,000 tons,
excluding squid, to 719,000 tons, including squid.2 4 Earlier, in June
of 1975, the United States had proposed a quota of 550,000 tons,
including squid.2 5
The ICNAF agreement operates on a two-tier system of individual
species quotas for each nation and a total catch quota for the entire
area. The overall quota is less than the sum of the individual
species quotas. This allows member nations to focus their fishing
efforts as precisely as possible on target species. The 1976 individ-
ual species quotas were adopted by the ICNAF in June of 1975.26
At the September session of the ICNAF's 1975 meeting, the
Commission also agreed to limit the number of days each year that
foreign fleets could catch haddock, cod, redfish and plaice. The
principal nations affected by the new limitations are the Soviet
22. Farina, Tunaboats Wrapping Up Difficult Year, Evening Tribune
(San Diego), Oct. 30, 1975, § B, at 8, col. 1.
23. San Diego Union, Oct. 28, 1975, § -B, at 3, col. 1.
24. N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1975, at 13, coL 8.
25. 73 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 220 (1975).
26. Id. at 221.
Union, Portugal, East and West Germany. Besides this limitation,
the ICNAF agreed to exclude fishing vessels equipped to catch
haddock and yellowtail flounder from most of Georges Bank off
the coast of Maine.27
NMFS Proposed Regulations Allow United States-Based Fisher-
men to Violate International Yellowfin Conservation Agreement:
On October 24, 1975, Robert W. Schoning, Director of the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), issued proposed regulations giv-
ing him authority to suspend a requirement that United States-
based tunaboats make daily radio reports to the Coast Guard.
Current NMFS regulations require United States tunaboats to radio
their exact location to the Coast Guard daily. The tuna fishermen
are also required to enter their location in the ship's log, which
is open to federal inspection.
Under the proposed regulation, United States tuna fishermen
would be able to violate international yellowfin tuna conservation
agreements by fishing undetected inside the five million square mile
Eastern Pacific yellowfin conservation zone established by the
eight-nation Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission. 28
National Marine Fisheries Service Proposes Porpoise Mortality
Quota: The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) proposed
new regulations in September of 1975 limiting the amount of por-
poises that can be taken by United States-based tuna fishermen
while fishing in the tropical waters of the Eastern Pacific Ocean.
Specifically, the NMFS proposed that the porpoise mortality rate
be set somewhere between 50,000 and 110,000 per year. Addition-
ally, NMFS observers are to be placed aboard every vessel in the
United States tuna fleet to enforce regulation.
Tuna fishermen, who use the porpoise as an indicator of yellow-
fin tuna, fear the new regulations, which contain strict penalties
for noncompliance, could trigger a massive shutdown of the fleet.
They point to a report prepared by Morton M. Miller, chief of the
economic and marketing research division of the NMFS, which con-
cedes that, even without the regulations, much of the fleet could
be in economic trouble by 1976. Miller's report says that if the
regulations are approved, the United States may be forced to import
more tuna from foreign countries to make up for the deficit in
production.
Robert W. Schoning, the Director of NMFS, is expected to review
27. N.Y. Times, supra note 24.
28. Hudson, Tuna Fishing Rule Shift Questioned, San Diego Union, Oct.
24, 1975, § A, at 1, col. 1.
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the comments on the proposed regulation by the end of the year
and decide whether the quota and observer provisions of the regu-
lations should be approved. 29
Federal Courts Lack Jurisdiction Over Challenge to IPHC
Regulations: The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit on March 11, 1975, affirmed a dismissal for lack of juris-
diction of an action challenging a regulation of the International
Pacific Halibut Commission."0 Fishermen brought the action seek-
ing declaratory judgment and injunction against enforcement of the
regulation which required them to return to the sea any halibut ac-
cidentally caught when trawling for other fish. They asserted ju-
risdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), claiming
that the Secretary of State's approval of the regulation constituted
agency action within the provisions of the APA .nd therefore was
reviewable in federal courts. To support the injunction, the fisher-
men maintained that Congress' action in providing criminal penal-
ties for violation of the Commission regulation constituted an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the President
because it provided no guidelines for the approval of the regulation.
The court of appeals rejected the claim of jurisdiction based on
the APA, noting that by its terms the APA does not apply where
agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. The court
held that the Act would not apply to the Secretary's approval
because for purposes of the appeal, the Secretary's actions were
actions of the President, and law commits presidential action in the
field of foreign affairs to presidential discretion.
The court further found that plaintiffs lacked standing because
they could not show actual injury. The mere existence of the stat-
ute was insufficient to establish a "case or controversy." By dicta,
however, the court stated that even if plaintiffs' claim had been
justiciable, the delegation of power was proper because of the wider
presidential discretion required when legislation is to be effectuated
in the international field.
United States Enforces Continental Shelf Fishery Resources
29. Hudson, Restrictions Called Threat to Tuna Fleet, San Diego Union,
Oct. 26, 1975, § B, at 1, cOl. 6.
30. Jensen v. National Marine Fisheries Serv. (NOAA), 512 F.2d 1189
(9th Cir. 1975).
Law: During 1975, the United States Coast Guard seized ships of
several countries for taking certain protected species of continental
shelf creatures. A law prohibiting foreign vessels from taking
"continental shelf fishery resources" was amended January 2, 1974,
by the addition of a "definitions" section containing a list of
species.31 The protected species include types of abalones, crabs,
lobsters, sponges and others s.32  The Coast Guard delayed enforce-
ment until December 5, 1974, in order to give notice to foreign
governments of new enforcement procedures.
33 As was expected,8 4
enforcement of the law increased seizures by the Coast Guard.
The first encounter under the new procedures occurred when
an Italian vessel was seized on February 2, for taking lob-
ster while trawling 81 miles off Nantucket Island, Massachusetts.Y5
Later, the Polish trawler Wicko was seized while docked at Port
Newark, New Jersey. A consent decree was entered, which imposed
a fine of $125,000 against the vessel and $25,000 against the captain.
On June 12, a Bulgarian vessel was seized, and agreed to pay the
largest fine yet imposed for such a violation: $420,000 against the
ship and $5,000 against the captain. 36 The Coast Guard also seized
the Japanese lobster boat Tokachi Maru on July 15, when it was
found trawling 65 miles off Maryland. 87 The first Soviet vessel to
be seized for a violation of this law (the sixth such seizure of 1975)
was taken to New York harbor after being apprehended on August
17. Again, the resource being exploited was lobster, 84 miles off
New Jersey.38 The vessel was released after a $100,000 settlement
of civil and criminal charges was obtained.39
FISHING
200-Mile Fishing Zone Bill Passed Overwhelmingly by the
House: On October 9, 1975, the House of Representatives passed
the Marine Fisheries Conservation Act of 1975 by a vote of 208 to
101. 4 0 The 1975 Act extends the United States exclusive fishery
31. 16 U.S.C. § 1085 (Supp. IV, 1974).
32. Id. See also 50 C.F.R. §§ 295.1, 295.2 (1974).
33. 121 CONG. REC. S 2151 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1975); State Dept. Commu-
nication to Foreign Countries, Hearings on S.1988 Before the Senate Foreign
Relations Comm., 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 23 (1974).
34. See Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 671.
35. San Diego Union, Feb. 3, 1975, § A, at 4, col. 2. See also CONG. REC.,
supra note 33, at S 2150.
36. Evening Tribune (San Diego), July 11, 1975, § C, at 16, col. 1.
37. Id., July 16, 1975, § A, at 5, col. 8.
38. N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1975, at 29, col 4.
39. San Diego Union, Aug. 30, 1975, § A, at 2, col. 1.
40. H.R. 200, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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zone from 12 to 200 miles offshore, and establishes a comprehensive
management program for United States and foreign fishermen.
The House bill authorizes the collection of federal license fees from
all those fishing within the zone, including United States fishermen.
However, United States fishermen have priority to licenses, and a
portion of the fees collected will be used to reimburse United States
fishermen for the costs of foreign fishing fees.
The three most controversial aspects of the bill include its effect
on distant water fishermen, such as the California based tuna
industry and the gulfcoast shrimpers, and the possibility of con-
flicts between federal and state policies in areas presently managed
by the states. The third problem is the bill's effect on the United
Nations Law of the Sea Conference.
Representative Robert L. Leggett, Chairman of the House Sub- "
Committee on Fisheries, explained to concerned congressmen that
the bill contains built-in protections for the tuna and shrimp
industry because it exempts highly migratory species, such as tuna,
from the United States exclusive jurisdiction. This exception is an
attempt to discourage foreign retaliation which could cripple the
United States tuna fleet. The bill also amends the Fisherman's Pro-
tective Act to include reimbursement for any fines imposed by
foreign governments in lieu of confiscation of the catch.41 More-
over, the bill provides for some limited reimbursement to United
States-based fishermen for the acquisition of foreign fishing
licenses.
Federal-state conflicts will be resolved through the establishment
of Regional Marine Fisheries Councils made up of members ap-
pointed from coastal states. Furthermore, the bill requires the fed-
eral government to find that a state's action substantially and
adversely affects the federal management plan before federal juris-
diction in the three-mile state waters can be invoked.
The Administration and many members of Congress are most
concerned that the bill's passage would destroy the United States
bargaining position at the United Nations Law of the Sea Confer-
ence. They contend that with the important topics of pollution con-
trol, unimpeded navigation through straits and jurisdiction over
41. Present law allows compensation for the loss of confiscated fish, but
not for the monetary value paid in lieu of confiscation.
seabed resources to be decided, the passage of the 200-mile bill
would seriously impede the United States ability to make conces-
sions in order to achieve desirable results in these other areas.
However, proponents cite a need for immediate conservation meas-
ures to save dwindling fishery resources.
The House version of the Marine Conservation Act of 1975 is
pending in the Senate Committee on Commerce awaiting decision
by the full Senate on its own bill.42 Last year the Senate passed
a similar measure by a vote of 68 to 27. 43
Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975: The Atlantic Tunas
Convention Act of 1975 was enacted on August 5, 1975, to implement
the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic
Tunas (ICCAT) which was signed by 19 countries on May 14,
1966.44 The ICCAT was created to conduct research on tuna and
make recommendations on maximum catch levels in the Atlantic.
As of 1975, the Commission had adopted three recommendations
which have been accepted by all signing nations. Two of the
recommendations set minimum weight requirements for bluefin
and yellowfin tuna. The third limits each nation's catch to "recent
levels."
The 1975 Act was needed because the Secretary of Commerce was
powerless to require compliance with the ICCAT regulations with-
out domestic legislation. Under the 1975 Act, the Secretary may
promulgate regulations to implement the ICCAT's recommenda-
tions. The Secretary is given enforcement powers through the
Coast Guard, United States Customs Service, and involved coastal
states.
Brazil and the United States Initial New Shrimp Fishing
Agreement: On March 14, 1975, Brazil and the United States signed
a new agreement regulating shrimp harvesting by United States
fishermen off the coast of Brazil. The new agreement is an exten-
sion of a 1972 shrimp treaty.
The 1972 agreement was negotiated in response to Brazil's
asserted 200-mile economic zone. This jurisdictional claim, which
the United States refused to recognize, sought to control an area
long used by United States shrimp fishermen. In an effort to avoid
confrontation, each side began negotiations in October of 1971. The
resulting agreement and its 1975-76 extension broke new ground
42. S. 961, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
43. S. 1988, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
44. Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975, 16 U.S.C.A. § 971 et seq.
(1975).
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in several areas. First, the United States agreed to limit the entry
of its own citizens into a high seas fishery. Second, as a result
of the agreement, a foreign government is granted unprecedented
unilateral enforcement powers against United States citizens.
Third, the United States agreed to collect fees from United States
fishermen and transfer the fees to Brazil for the enforcement of
the conservation agreement. Although revolutionary in many
aspects, the agreement contains a savings clause that allows amend-
ment by international agreement.
The 1975 agreement substantially follows the prior treaty, except
that it lowers the permissible vessels limit from 325 per quarter
to 200 vessels per quarter during 1975, and 175 vessels per quarter
in 1976. Additionally, the annual enforcement funds have been
increased from $200,000 to $361,000.4 5
United States and U.S.S.R. Reach Agreement on Pacific and
Middle Atlantic Fishery Issues: On February 26, 1975, representa-
tives of the United States and the Soviet Union reached an agree-
ment on the conservation of Middle Atlantic fishery resources and
on measures aimed at minimizing fishing gear conflicts between
United States and Soviet vessels. The new agreement calls for
stricter enforcement of United States continental shelf fishing
regulations and strengthens measures designed to prevent fishing-
related conflicts between Soviet mobile gear trawlers and United
States fixed gear vessels.
46
A similar treaty concerning Northern Pacific fisheries was signed
in Washington, D.C., on July 18, 1975. Under the new agreement,
the Soviet Union is required to close off large areas of the Pacific
to its fishermen in order to conserve endangered species such as
halibut, rockfish, and crab. In addition, limitations on Soviet
catches were established for pollock, halibut and rockfish.
47
Equador Seizes More Tunaboats: From January 25, to February
2, 1975, Equador seized seven United States tunaboats for fishing
without licenses within that nation's claimed 200-mile territorial
45. Offshore Shrimp Fisheries Act Amendment of 1975, 16 U.S.C.A. §
1100b-i et seq. (1975).
46. 72 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 426 (1975).
47. 73 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 230 (1975).
sea.48 Although 154 United States boats have been arrested or
fined in the past ten years, these recent seizures were by far the
most costly in terms of lost fishing time (the boats being held as
long as 46 days49 instead of three or four), confiscation of catches,
increased fines, and other costs.50 The skippers estimated the total
of these losses at a record $4.3 million. 1 The cost of a license
has tripled in the last two years; the cost of all seven vessels for
a sixty-day period would have been $231,470, although two ships
would have been denied licenses because of their large capacity. 2
There were reports of violence and looting aboard the vessels
while held in the port of Salinas. Several of the crewmen were
fired upon, beaten, and jailed, according to the reports; at least two
were seriously injured.53  Among retaliatory measures urged"
was a bill introduced in the House of Representatives which would
stop the sale of a Navy ship to Equador."5 (Many of the ships
in Equador's Navy came from the United States, and some of these
have been used in seizures of American tunaboats).r3
The fishermen sought reimbursement under the Fishermen's
Protection Act of 1971. 57 The Act provides that the United States
Treasury reimburse the applicant for all expenses paid as a condi-
tion of release, and that an insurance fund compensate in full for
catch confiscation and vessel and equipment damage, and in part
for lost fishing time. 8
Seizures by the United States: In addition to seizing several for-
eign vessels under the newly-enforced continental shelf fishery re-
sources law, 9 the United States Coast Guard also seized foreign
boats for violations of the 12-mile United States contiguous fishing
zone during 1975. On May 17, the Polish vessel Kalmar was seized
in the waters off Monterey, California.s0 The action renewed com-
48. Evening Tribune (San Diego), Feb. 3, 1975, § A, at 3, col. 6. See
also Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 672.
49. Evening Tribune (San Diego), March 12, 1975, § B, at 5, col. 1.
50. Lagies, Tunaboat Dilemma-Principle or Price?, Evening Tribune
(San Diego) March 14, 1975, § A, at 1, col. 3.
51. Farina, Tuna Seizure Losses Pegged at $4.3 Million, Evening Tribune
(San Diego), May 8, 1975, § B, at 1, col. 2.
52. Hudson, Few Expect Boats to Pay Equadorian Fee, San Diego Union,
Feb. 24, 1975, § B, at 1, col. 5.
53. Holles, Tuna Fleet Asks U.S. Aid Off Equador, N.Y. Times, March
9, 1975, at 20, col. 5.
54. San Diego Union, July 23, 1975, § B, at 4, col. 1.
55. H.R.J. Res. 498, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
56. San Diego Union, supra note 54.
57. 22 U.S.C. § 1971 et seq. (Supp. II, '1973).
58. Lagies, supra note 50, at col 6.
59. See notes 31-39 supra and accompanying text.
60. L.A. Times, May 21, 1975, pt. 1, at 23, coL 1.
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plaints that Russian and Polish fleets were depleting West Coast
fisheries. The U.S.S.R. fishes under a treaty with the United States
which allows it to take Pacific hake up to the 12-mile limit.
Russian fishing facilities include huge floating factories, which
remain off the California coast for up to six months processing raw
fish. Another seizure occurred in the Gulf of Mexico, where an 82-
foot Cuban vessel was taking shrimp within the 12-mile zone. The
ship was intercepted and taken 11 miles northeast of Port Arkansas,
Texas.q1
The zone off Alaska also saw seizure activity. On August 7, a
South Korean trawler was taken and fined $415,000.62 The
seizure of the Japanese Eiku Mar Number 33 in April was notable
because, for the first time, the United States obtained title to a
vessel through an out-of-court settlement for a violation of United
States fishery laws. 63 The two companies owning the vessel agreed
to surrender the ship (whose value has been estimated at between
$400,000 and $1.25 million) and the catch (which was sold for
$12,000) rather than pay the $350,000 fine. After being sighted within
the 12-mile zone off Alaska by Coast Guard aircraft, the Eiku Maru
headed for open sea, ignoring morse code and smoke flare messages
to stop. It was halted six and one-half hours later, and 12-miles
of longline, which had been retrieved from the waters where the
ship was first sited, was matched with fishing gear on board.
POLLUTION AND POLLUTION CONTROL
IINTERNATIONAL
Effects of Oil pollution on Marine Environment Noted: In a
statement on January 30, 1975, before the Senate Commerce Com-
mittee, Dr. John M. Hunt, of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Insti-
titution, discussed various aspects of oil pollution in the marine
environment. 64 Of the approximately six million metric tons of
oil dumped into the oceans annually, he said half evaporates into
the air, 30 percent sinks or is deposited on the beaches as tar, and
the remainder is broken down chemically or by marine organisms.
61. San Diego Union, Aug. 3, 1975, § A, at 8, col. 7.
62. Id., Sept. 25, 1975, § A, at 2, col. 1.
63. 121 CONG. Rsc. S 7155 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1975).
64. 5 BNA ENvn REP. CURRENT DELOPmENTS 1557 (1975).
He said sea fowl and tidal creatures are the primary victims of oil
pollution.
Dr. Hunt encouraged the development of offshore drilling as
opposed to increasing the use of tankers in obtaining oil. He said
that the combined aspects of transporting oil now account for one-
third of the marine oil pollution, and use of tankers presents a risk
of pollution 20 times greater than does offshore drilling.
Optimism at International Conference: The speakers at the
March 25 through 27, 1975 meeting of the International Conference
on Prevention and Control of Oil Pollution were optimistic about
the progress being made in development of new methods of mini-
mizing damage from oil spills. 5 A Coast Guard spokesman noted
a proposed plan whereby supertankers coming from the Valdez,
Alaska terminal of the new pipeline would be tracked by the Coast
Guard to guard against spill damage.
An official of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion stressed the importance of coastal zone management. Under
the Coastal Zone Management Act, states will have a voice in such
matters as compensation for the costs of onshore facilities and
spill liability laws. (The Act provides funding for approved state
plans, and states have until September 1977 to submit their plans.)
A representative of Exxon Research and Development Company
spoke about self-mixing oil slick dispersants which can be applied
by aircraft. These dispersants are advantageous because they can
be applied rapidly and uniformly.
Intergovernmental Meeting on the Protection of the Mediterran-
ean: On January 28, 1975, the United Nations Environment Pro-
gram convened an intergovernmental meeting in Barcelona, Spain,
to deal with pollution in the Mediterranean. Representatives of 18
Mediterranean nations and various international organizations at-
tended the meeting.
The principal concern of the convention was the implementation
of an integrated planning and development program of resource
management with coordinated programs for research and monitor-
ing of pollution. In addition, it was recommended that all coastal
nations become parties to the 1973 International Convention on the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships. Finally, the conference urged
establishment of a regional oil combating center to deal with a
major oil spill in the Mediterranean. 66
65. Id. at 1926.
66. 14 INT'L LEGAL MATELami s 464 (1975).
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United Nations Program on Ocean Monitoring Approved: The
Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Program
approved an ocean monitoring program during its April 17 through
May 2, 1975 meeting in Nairobi. The purpose of the program is
to assess human impact on the physical, chemical and biological
aspects of the ocean. Additionally, the program will consider the
relationship of the oceans to the earth's climate. The program will
consist of various ocean baseline stations situated at strategic points
throughout the earth's oceans. 67
Liberian Tanker Charged in Florida Oil Spillage: On November
7, 1975, charges were filed by the United States against the owners
and master of a Liberian tanker for dumping 50,000 gallons of crude
oil near the Florida Keyes in July of 1974. The spill blackened
beaches from Marathon to Dry Tortugas, Florida.
The 42,000 ton tanker Garbis was identified by Coast Guard Offi-
cials following an investigation of 247 ships in the East and Gulf
Coast areas. The ship's owners will be notified that they face a
maximum $5,000 fine plus costs of the oil spill cleanup-about
$367,500.68
DOmESTIC-FEDERAL
Effects of Ocean Dumping Unclear: An Army Corps of Engineers
spokesman has stated that preliminary Corps studies of disposal
areas show that ocean dumping of dredged materials may not be
harmful to the environment. Speaking before the Senate Com-
merce Subcommittee on Oceans and the Atmosphere on May 20,
1975, the spokesman said these studies indicate the dumping may
be beneficial. For example, lobsters seemed to prefer dumping
sites, he said, and water quality is improved when some pollutants
adhere to the dredged materials.
The Subcommittee was told by an Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) spokesman that all dumping in the Pacific Ocean
should be stopped, and dumping in the Gulf of Mexico should be
reduced to ten percent of the 1973 amount. He said it was the
EPA's intention to stop much industrial ocean dumping as alterna-
tive disposal methods are created. The EPA spokesman noted that
67. Id. at 1083.
68. L.A. Times, Nov. 7, 1975, pt. I, at 2, col. 5.
a major problem was the disposal of sewage sludge from upgraded
treatment plants, especially along the coasts where high population
density leaves little land which can be used as a disposal site. 0
Gulf of Mexico Permit Issued to Shell Oil: The EPA on February
21, 1975, issued a special ocean dumping permit which will allow
Shell Oil Company to dump 100,000 tons of sludge into the Gulf
of Mexico for one year.70 An attorney for the National Wildlife
Federation said that a special permit (which lasts up to three years
as opposed to one year for an interim permit) should not have been
issued since EPA regulations require that a bioassay be conducted
under approved EPA procedures. Although a bioassay had been
conducted, the EPA had not yet promulgated approved procedures.
EPA Reports On Ocean Dumping Program: In a report sub-
mitted to Congress on March 3, 1975, the EPA discussed its ocean
dumping program.71 The long-range plan involves three stages;
the issuance of regulations on procedures, the publication of criteria
for issuance or denial of permits, and the designation of specific
dumping sites. In carrying out the first stage, the EPA published
regulations on October 15, 1973, which will be amended according
to future experience. As to the second phase, some criteria have
already been published,72 and others are being developed in coop-
eration with other government agencies. The EPA hopes to com-
plete the third stage by the summer of 1976. The regulations and
criteria issued during the first and second stages conditionally
approved existing sites. Designations of other sites will be accom-
panied by environmental impact statements, and will be noticed
in the Federal Register.
Several agencies will be cooperating under the plan. For
example, the current Coast Guard surveillance and enforcement
operations will continue, and baseline surveying in fiscal 1976 will
be performed largely by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration. The report acknowledged current claims that
some ocean dumping may be beneficial to the environment, al-
though the same substances would be detrimental to freshwater
life forms. It said that if these were proven, the EPA would
encourage ocean dumping over alternative disposal methods. It
cited as most urgent the need to further develop techniques for
sampling and laboratory analysis.
69. 6 BNA ENvm. REP. CURRENT DEVELoPMNTs 213 (1975).
70. 5 BNA ENVui. REP. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 1689 (1975).
71. Id. at 1926.
72. 40 C.FR. § 227.1 et seq. (1975).
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Navy Dumping Fuel at Sea: A 1975 audit of the Naval Petroleum
Office revealed that Navy oilers disposed of approximately 6.2
million gallons of contaminated fuel at sea in fiscal year 1974.73
The fuel discharges cost the Navy $2.3 million, which does not
include losses from oil spillage by other naval vessels. Navy audi-
tors first reported the dumping of large quantities of petroleum
at sea in 1961. Prior to that, the Navy employed private tank
barges to off-load various petroleum products for reprocessing at
coastal refineries. Reprocessing would save the Navy an estimated
$2.2 million annually.74
Agencies Agree On Regulation Of Nuclear Plants On Navigable
Waters: Pursuant to an agreement signed by the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission (NRC) and the Army Corps of Engineers, NRC
will review the environmental impact of nuclear power plants on
navigable waters, and the corps will inform NRC of factors involv-
ing shoreline changes, siltation and sedimentation, dredging and
filling effects, and location of structures in such waters. The agree-
ment aims to avoid duplication of efforts by the agencies in regu-
lating such plants to assure minimum environmental impact.
75
Federal Agencies to Comply with All State Water Pollution
Control Requirements: The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit on February 13, 1975, held that 1972 amendments to
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act require federal agencies
to comply fully with all respects of state discharge permit pro-
grams. 76 California and Washington had proposed water pollution
permit programs to the Administrator of the EPA, pursuant to sec-
tion 402 of the Act. These states appealed when the Administrator
exempted federal agencies from compliance with the programs.
The Ninth Circuit directed the Administrator to reconsider the
states' applications.
The court found that the Act contemplates that states will take
the lead in the attack on water pollution, with the federal govern-
ment performing a supportive function. The court held pursuant
to the Act's purpose Congress waived exclusive legislative jurisdic-
73. 121 CONG. REC. H 3310 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1975).
74. Id. H 3605 (daily ed. May 1, 1975).
75. 6 BNA ENvnL REP. CuRRE= DsvELoPxmNTs 533 (1975).
76. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. v. EPA, 511 F.2d
963 (9th Cir. 1975).
tion over the activities of federal agencies in providing for state
programs under section 402.
The United States Supreme Court granted the EPA's petition for
a writ of certiorari on June 23, 1975.77
EPA to Regulate All Radioactive Discharges into Navigable
Waters: On December 9, 1975, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit held that the EPA is required by the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 to regulate the
discharge of all radioactive materials into navigable waters.78 The
EPA had argued that since the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 gave
regulatory powers over certain types of discharges (source, by-
product, and special nuclear material) to the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, only discharges not in those areas were committed to the
EPA's regulation. The court found that the 1972 Amendments'
definition of pollution to include "radioactive materials" clearly and
unambiguously meant "all radioactive materials."
Definition of FWPCA "Navigable Waters" Expanded: On March
27, 1975, the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia granted the motion for summary judgment of environmental
groups in a suit brought by them to force the Army Corps of En-
gineers to expand its definition of "navigable waters."7 9 The Corps'
definition had been keyed to susceptibility of navigation and the
ebb and flow of tides.80 The court held that the intent of Congress
in defining "navigable waters" as the "waters of the United States,
including the territorial seas" in the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act Amendments of 1972 was to assert jurisdiction to the max-
imum allowed by the commerce clause. The Corps was directed to
revoke its current definition and to publish new regulations con-
sistent with this holding.
DOMESTIC-STATE
New York Beaches Not Immediately Threatened By Ocean
Dumping: A National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) report and local municipal investigations indicate that no
immediate threat is posed either to public health or to the beaches
of Long Island by ocean dumping off the New York coast. It had
77. EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 422 U.S.
1041 (1975).
78. Colorado Public Interest Research Group v. Train, 507 F.2d 743 (10th
Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 998 (1975).
79. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
80. See 39 Fed. Reg. 12119 (1974).
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been feared that the dumping of municipal sewage sludge about
12 miles offshore had created a threatening mass of black sludge
which was constantly moving towards shore."' Although almost
half a billion cubic feet per year of the wastes have been dumped,
the NOAA report indicated "[t]here has been essentially no
buildup" of sludge at the dumping site.8 2 However, the report
did state that dumping may be associated with damage such as fin
rot in fish and deformations in crustacaea, in addition to increased
levels of coliform bacteria. In concluding that there is no imme-
diate threat, the report supported the position held by the EPA.
The Commissioner of the Town of Hempsted's Department of
Conservation and Waterways also said that no such mass was mov-
ing towards the shore.8 3 His studies of floor samples demonstrated
that sewage sludge dumped at the site is no longer identifiable
seven and one-half miles south of Rockaway Inlet. The Commis-
sioner disapproved of suggestions that the dump site be moved
further seaward.
Texas Enacts Oil Spill Legislation: On June 9, 1975, the Governor
of Texas signed into law additions to the state's Water Code aimed
at prevention and control of damage from spills of oil and other
hazardous substances.8 4 Among the provisions are comprehensive
reporting requirements and the creation of an agreement whereby
state highway department personnel, equipment and materials can
be used for cleanup operations. The Act also establishes a coastal
protection fund, to be reimbursed by the federal government or
the party responsible for the spill.
Philadelphia Gets Ocean Dumping Permit: On February 14, 1975,
the EPA issued to Philadelphia a one-year interim ocean dumping
permit.8 5 Issued pursuant to the Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act of 1974, the permit authorizes the city to dump
150 million gallons of sewage sludge into the Atlantic Ocean at a
point approximately 50 miles southeast of Delaware Bay. However,
Philadelphia is required to monitor environmental effects, to
81. See Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 680.
82. 6 BNA ENvir. REP. CuRRENT DEVELOPMENTS 405 (1975).
83. Forgernon, Ocean Dumping Is No Threat To L.I. Beaches, Udell Says,
N.Y. Times, April 27, 1975, § 5, at 16, col. 1.
84. 6 BNA ENvm. REP. CuRm DEVELOPmENTS 455 (1975).
85. 5 BNA ENvnl. REP. CURRENT DEVELOPMVENTS 1689 (1975).
develop alternative disposal methods, and to reduce ocean dumping
to 50 percent by January 1, 1979, and cease by 1981. The EPA
granted the city funds to help develop the alternatives. The issu-
ance of the permit will be challenged by the state of Maryland and
Ocean City, Maryland.
Further Santa Barbara Channel Litigation: The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on February 24,1975,
vacated a federal district court's dismissal of an action brought by
oil and gas lessees who challenged the Secretary of the Interior's
order denying permission to construct an additional drilling plat-
form.8 6 Permission to construct the new platform had been granted
prior to the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill. Immediately after that
disaster, the Secretary suspended all activities on the lease. In
1971, he withdrew permission to construct new platforms because of
environmental dangers. The federal district court dismissed the oil
companies' complaint, finding the withdrawal of permission to be
within the Secretary's statutory authority, and not an abuse of
discretion as alleged.
Noting that under the Outer Contenental Shelf Lands Act the
Secretary is empowered to regulate activities for conservation of
the Shelf's natural resources, including marine life, recreational
potential, and aesthetic values, the court determined that without
congressional authorization, the Secretary has no condemnation
powers. Therefore, the court remanded to decide whether the order
constituted a taking of property within the meaning of the fifth
amendment. If so, such an order would be beyond the Secretary's
power. The court stated that a suspension so interferes with the
beneficial use of the property as to constitute a taking when its
duration is indefinite. The complaint should be dismissed, the court
said, if the Secretary's reasons for suspension sufficiently restrict
the duration of suspension as not to constitute a taking.
California Halts Offshore Oil and Gas DeveZopments: The Gover-
nor of California signed into law a prohibition on construction of
and additions to offshore oil and gas pipelines. The law, which
became effective January 1, 1976, is intended to halt new develop-
ment of oil and gas resources until the state legislature can act
upon a program soon to be completed by the California Coastal
Zone Conservation Commission. Penalties under the law include
a $100,000 civil charge and a fine of $5,000 for every day of
violation.87
86. Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975).
87. 6 BNA ENviR. REP. CUnMENT DEVELoPMENTs 912 (1975).
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Study Shows Louisiana Coast not Damaged by Offshore Oil
Production: The State of Louisiana's Department of Conservation
released a report in July of 1975, stating that oil drilling and pro-
duction off the coast of Louisiana has not significantly damaged
the area's ecological balance.88 The study was conducted in
Timbalier Bay which has produced oil for 38 years.
Dr. R.!. Minzies of Florida State University headed a group of
23 scientists in the two-year project. The scientists reported
natural phenomena, such as changes of seasons and floods, had a
much greater impact on the ecology of the bay than oil production
and drilling.
SEABED RESOURCES
Senate Passes Amendments to Other Continental Shelf Act of
1953: On July 30, 1975, the Senate passed and sent to the House
legislation 9 updating the Outer Continental Shelf Act of 1953. Un-
der the 1953 Act, oil companies, either singly or jointly, bid on 5,760-
acre tracts preselected by the Interior Department. The highest
bidder could win the right to conduct exploratory drilling and
extract discovered oil and gas.90
The new legislation authorizes a wide variety of new bidding sys-
tems designed to reduce preliminary cash bonus bidding, thus mak-
ing it easier for small independent companies to enter into Outer
Continental Shelf exploration and development. The bill also
increases the Government's royalty allowance from 123 to 16%
percent. Under the amendments, governors of coastal states are
able to establish regional Outer Continental Shelf Advisory Boards
to advise the Secretary of the Interior regarding the size, timing
and location of proposed Outer Continental Shelf leases. If the
regional advisory board or a governor of any potentially affected
state makes a specific recommendation regarding the proposed
lease sale or development plan, the Secretary of the Interior must
accept the recommendation unless it is inconsistent with the
national interest.
88. 121 CoNG. REc. E 4191 (daily ed. July 28, 1975).
89. S. 521, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
90. Kenworthy, Major Changes Proposed in System of Leasing Oil and
Gas Tracts beyond the 3-mile Limit, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1975, at 13, col. 1.
One of the most significant features of the bill is the new
absolute liability provision for oil spill damage. The bill makes the
Outer Continental Shelf lessee liable, without regard to fault, for
the total cost of control and removal of the spilled oil within 200
nautical miles of the baseline of the United States, Canada, or
Mexico. It also imposes absolute liability upon the lessee for dam-
ages to land resources or businesses.91 The lessee is liable for the
first $22 million of damage; any additional damages or restoration
costs are paid by an Offshore Oil Pollution Settlement Fund created
by the bill. The fund consists of a $200 million corpus to be created
by a two and one-half cent tax on each barrel of oil produced from
the Outer Continental Shelf.
Senate Adopts Amendments to the Coastal Zone Management
Act of 1972: The Senate on July 16, 1975, passed a series of amend-
ments to the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 designed to help
states deal with the present and future effects of Outer Continental
Shelf oil exploration and development. 92 The proposed amend-
ments authorize a $250 million Costal Energy Impact Fund to pro-
vide federal grants and loans to state programs directed toward
ameliorating the adverse effects of Outer Continental Shelf energy
development. The purpose of the fund is to establish a primary
source of money to states and municipalities for the construction
of schools, roads, sewers and other related facilities needed to cope
with the large influx of oil-related personnel.
States which have experienced net adverse effects within the last
three years may also receive compensating grants or loans for up
to five years after final passage of the bill.0 3
Recent Developments in the Southern California Leasing Con-
troversy: On October 31, 1975, Secretary of Interior Thomas S.
Kleppe announced the United States would sell 1.25 million acres
of oil leases located off the coast of Southern California on Decem-
ber 9, 1975. 94 The leases will be issued despite a Bureau of Land
Management study which concluded a major oil spill the size of
the 1969 Santa Barbara disaster could be expected every seven to
ten years if the offshore oil development is allowed to follow
industry plans. The Interior department originally planned to sell
1.6 million acres of leases but trimmed the figure to exempt areas
where drilling rigs could be seen from the shore. Secretary Kleppe
91. 121 CONG. REC. S 14287 (daily ed. July 30, 1975).
92. S. 586, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
93. 121 CoNG. REc. S 12842 (daily ed. July 16, 1975).
94. Richmond, Go Ahead Given on Offshore Oil, Evening Tribune (San
Diego), Oct. 31, 1975, § A, at 1, col. 1.
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also said an additional three-quarter-mile buffer zone between state
and federal waters would be provided in those areas where the state
has not already leased tracts for development.
Government studies put the resource potential of the area at
between 1.6 billion and 2.7 billion barrels of oil and 2.4 trillion to
4.8 trillion cubic feet of gas. The largest area to be leased is the
639,360 acre Cortez Bank located 94 miles west of San Diego.
Scientists Robert Owen and Paul Smith, of the National Marine
Fisheries Service laboratory in La Jolla, California, feel that the
Cortez Bank is a poor choice for the proposed Outer Continental
Shelf Development. They contend ocean currents would force any
oil spill near the Cortez Bank directly to San Diego's shores 5
State and local officials, fearing they may become oil spill victims,
formed a coalition to delay the proposed lease sale. They cited as
their reasons for seeking the delay a need for evaluation of near-
shore and on-shore impacts, as well as establishment of a national
fund to assist state and local governments in dealing with the large
influx of oil-related personnel. The Southern California city offi-
cials also asked for a guarantee of absolute indemnity for damage
from oil-related activities.96
Attempting to allay fears of local officials, the federal govern-
ment sent energy chief Frank Zarb to California on November 12,
1975. Representatives of ten Southern California cities told Mr.
Zarb the federal lease conditions were too lax and the environmental
safeguards inadequate. He promised to relay the message to Secre-
tary Kleppe.9 7 Seven days later, the coalition of 41 cities voted
unanimously to sue the federal government to block the proposed
lease. At the same time, the State of California instituted a similar
suit. It appears both suits will argue that the Interior Depart-
ment's Environmental Impact Statement was inadequate and that
the federal government is not receiving reasonable compensation
for the leases. 8
Despite the pending litigation, leases totaling $438.2 million were
sold on December 11, 1975. Department of Interior officials had
95. Smith, Offshore Oil Hunt Here Disclosed After 2 Months, San Diego
Union, Oct. 24, 1975, § A, at 1, col. 5.
96. Smith, Riley Urges County Suit to Delay Oil Leasing Program, L.A.
Times, Nov. 12, 1975, pt. II, at 1, col. 2.
97. San Diego Union, Nov. 15, 1975, § A, at 2, col. 4.
98. Id.
predicted that the bids would total between $1.5 billion and $2
billion.99
GAO Recommends Steps to Insure Efficient Lease Siting Pro-
cedures: In July of 1975, the General Accounting Office (GAO)
recommended to Secretary of Interior Stanley K. Hathaway a series
of steps designed to improve federal programs for establishing the
place and price of offshore oil leases. °00 The GAO recommended
that the Interior Department conduct federally-financed explora-
tion programs directed at appraisal of Outer Continental Shelf
leases, claiming that currently, the decision as to where to lease is
largely left to private industry.1 1 The GAO also recommended
that the Secretary establish a test program to evaluate, offer, and
lease entire geological structures as opposed to the present prac-
tice of leasing in tracts.
In addition, the GAO report states that federal government shelf
evaluation programs are being jeopardized by a data base inade-
quate to reasonably ensure a fair market return on leasing invest-
ments. The Interior Department commented that if the federal
government were to finance the explorations, development of the
resources would be delayed up to two years. 0 2
Environmental Impact Statement for Gulf of Mexico Tracts
Upheld: On March 27, 1975, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that an environmental impact statement
(EIS) prepared by the Department of Interior in connection with
the sale of oil and gas leases in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico met
the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA). 0 3 Environmental organizations and individuals brought
suit to block the sale of the leases, and 17 oil companies, who were
among those making bonus bids of over $1.5 billion for exploration
rights, intervened. Plaintiffs challenged the sale on four grounds.
First, they claimed that the EIS insufficiently analyzed the present
environment, the impact of the sale, the cumulative effect of oil
development in the area, and reasonable alternatives to the sale.
Second, they argued that defendant's evaluation of effects upon the
total environment, aquatic life, aesthetics, recreation, and other
resources was inadequate. The third ground urged was that the
decision to proceed with the sale constituted an abuse of discretion.
99. Fisher, Oil Lease Bids Fall Far Short of U.S. Estimate, L.A. Times,
Dec. 12, 1975, pt. I, at 1, col. 5.
100. 121 CONG. REc. S 12241 (daily ed. July 10, 1975).
101. 6 BNA ENvm. REP. CUmRMqT DEvMLoPMm'rs 490, 491 (1975).
102. Id. at 491.
103. Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Recent
Developments, supra note 1, at 688.
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Finally, they claimed that the sale frustrated NEPA by imposing
the duty to protect the environment from harm caused by construc-
tion of pipelines or onshore facilities upon the states rather than
the federal government.
The court first discussed the sufficiency of the EIS, stating the
requirement that it be sufficiently detailed to enable the court to
make a determination as to whether a good-faith attempt to protect
NEPA values has been made, to inform the public clearly and
specifically of the environmental costs, and to bring to light all seri-
ous problems and criticism. The court found the analysis of the
present environment adequate noting that, although analysis of
present air and water quality and of the Eastern Gulf ecosystem
as a whole was lacking, the EIS did analyze significant parts of
the biological environment and provided adequate geological infor-
mation. The court also found that the important information con-
cerning oil spill hazards was presented with sufficient clarity as
to enable a court to assess the environmental impact. Specifically,
a matrix system predicting the potential for oil spillage from each
of the tracts to reach and damage important resources, although
not as detailed as other systems, did not portray a breach of a good-
faith requirement in presenting the information. Also, the absence
of analysis of possible harm from military activities was not found
to be a fatal defect since the EIS stated that such an analysis had
been requested, thus informing the decisionmaker of the issue.
Further, the court found a failure to discuss effects of pipeline
location, construction, and breakage on particular areas cured by
discussions of general long-term effects and prior experiences in
the Gulf, and by lease stipulations as to pipeline location.
Cumulative effect analysis was found to be of sufficient detail.
The court stated that the plaintiffs' contentions concerning analysis
of effects of oil spillage from platforms, pipelines and tankers, and
of other pollutants, went to the degree of detail rather than the
lack -of it. The challenge to the consideration of alternatives was
also held to be without merit. Although the defendant had produced
a 352-page volume concerning alternatives, plaintiffs claimed that
analysis of enumerated others was required. The court's answer
to some of these was: "An alternative which would result in simi-
lar or greater harm need not be discussed."10 4
104. Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 825 (5th Cir. 1975).
Plaintiffs also asserted defendant's failure to comply with NEPA
sections requiring systematic, interdisciplinary study of methods
and alternatives aside from the EIS requirements. They specifi-
cally pointed to defendant's plans to do post-EIS testing of the floor
geologic conditions, claiming these violated the rule that an EIS
must meet the requirements alone. The court saw the sale of leases
as a special situation, wherein the defendant would have constant
control over future lessee activities. Significantly, the court held
that
where shortcomings in a major federal action can be corrected or
minimized when and if they surface, the EIS upon which such
action is authorized may meet NEPA's objectives with some less
detail and analysis than would otherwise be required.105
The court disagreed with plaintiffs' contention that the decision
to proceed with the sale was an abuse of discretion. The scope
of this inquiry, the court noted, did not extend to the merits of
the decision, but rather to insuring that the project's effects on the
environment were given consideration. Since the EIS was found
sufficient, the decision could only be rejected if it was obviously
made without regard to that information.
Finally, the court rejected plaintiffs' claim that the federal
government had abdicated its responsibility to protect the environ-
ment from harm due to pipeline and onshore facility construction.
The court noted that the leases required federal government selec-
tion of pipeline corridors, thus providing for future federal control.
Also, the court was satisfied that the states had been consulted
and warned about environmental dangers, as contemplated by
WEPA.
OCS Oil and Gas Lease Schedule Updated: The Bureau of Land
Management approved on June 12, 1975, a proposed schedule for
oil and gas lease sales on the Outer Continental Shelf.10 The
schedule was issued pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act'0 7 and certain regulations,108 and updated a schedule of
November 1974. Twenty-four sales are scheduled through 1978, in
the following areas: the Gulf of Mexico (six sales), the Pacific
Coast (three), Alaska (nine), and the Atlantic Coast (six). Tracts
-to be sold in 19751)9 were in the central Gulf of Mexico (July), off
Southern California (October), and in Cook Inlet off Alaska (De-
cember). The latter sale was scheduled contingent upon a judicial
105. Id. at 828.
106. 40 Fed. Reg. 25833 (1975).
107. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1970).
108. 43 C.F.R. § 3301.2 (1974).
109. 6 BNA Eimrm. REP. CURRENT DEVELOPMNTs 404 (1975).
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determination of United States sovereignty in the area, which was
so held on June 23, 1975.110
North Sea Begins to Yield Oil: On November 3, 1975, Britain
began receiving 50,000 barrels a day of crude oil from British
Petroleum's Forties Field in the North Sea."' The event marked
the end of a five-year, $1.6 billion effort to extract oil from the
largest of Britain's North Sea fields." 2 Oil is currently being trans-
ported through a 36-inch undersea pipeline 110 miles to Cruden Bay,
and then overland to await refining at Grangemouth, 126 miles to
the southwest; the 50,000 barrel-a-day rate is expected to climb to
400,000 barrels a day, or about 20 percent of Britain's daily needs,
within three years. The British sector of the North Sea is expected
to yield about two million barrels each day by 1980." 3
Earlier, in November of 1975, Phillips began pumping approxi-
mately 300,000 gallons a day from the Ekofisk field in the
Norwiegan sector to its $252 million Teeside Terminal in Northern
England. Most of the Ekofisk oil will be shipped back to Norway
for processing. 1
14
Claim of Exclusive Seabed Mining Rights Filed by Deepsea
Ventures, Inc.: Deepsea Ventures, Inc., on November 15, 1974, filed
a notice of discovery and claim of exclusive mining rights to a sea-
bed deposit of manganese nodules lying 1,300 kilometers southwest
of Mexico in the Pacific Ocean.1" 5  Deepsea asserted exclusive
rights to develop, mine and sell all the manganese nodules and other
minerals found in an area approximately 60,000 square kilometers
in size. Mining is to begin within 15 years and last for about 40
years. The expected output of the area is between 1.35 and 4
million wet metric tons of nodules per year.
In addition to the notice of claim and discovery, Deepsea filed
a request for diplomatic protection with the United States Depart-
ment of State."" The State Department replied:
110. United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184 (1975).
111. Trimborn, Queen Pushes Button, Oil Flows From the North Sea,
L.A. Times, Nov. 4, 1975, pt. I, at 6, col. 3.
112. See Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea IV: A Synopsis, 9
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 559, 570 (1973).
113. Trimborn, supra note 111.
114. Id.
115. 14INT'LLEGALMATEmSALs51 (1975).
116. Id. at 54.
The position of the United States Government on deep ocean min-
ing pending the outcome of the Law of the Sea Conference is that
the mining of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction
may proceed as a freedom of the high seas under existing interna-
tional law.'1 7
The Governments of Canada," 8 Great Britain" 9 and Australia 20
refused to recognize the claim.
Multinational Joint Venture for the Mining of Manganese
Nodules Agreed Upon: An agreement to form a multinational joint
venture for seabed mining was announced by four major marine
mining and metal processors in May of 1975.121 The four par-
ticipants are International Nickel Co. of Canada; International
Nickel Co., Inc. (a wholly owned subsidiary of the Canadian cor-
poration); Deepsea Mining Co. (a group of Japanese companies);
and AlMR (a group of German firms). The purpose of the mining
consortium is to research and develop techniques for mining man-
ganese nodules from the ocean floor. The agreement also contem-
plates the eventual establishment of joint mining facilities.122
Record Depth Reached In Seabed Drilling: In explorations being
conducted on the Atlantic continental shelf, the Deep Sea Drilling
Project bored to a record depth of 1,412 meters. Operating about
225 miles off the coast of northern Florida, the drilling ship Glomar
Challenger attained the record depth using a single tungsten-car-
bide bit, drilling for 85 hours. A Project spokesman said discovery
of an ancient coral reef under 9,000 feet of water, where drilling
was begun, would aid future explorations for continental shelf re-
sources.123 The scientists plan to leave November 29, 1975, for a
site 1,250 nautical miles northeast of Puerto Rico, where the Glomar
Challenger will attempt to drill 2,000 meters into the Mid-Atlantic
Ridge. 24 Whereas the 1,412-meter drilling was through sedimen-
tary rock, the Mid-Atlantic Ridge boring will penetrate hard ex-
truded material of the earth's crust.
The Project, which has as its main sponsor the National Science
Foundation and is managed by Scripps Institution of Oceanography,
117. Id. at 66.
118. Id. at 67.
119. Id. at 796.
120. Id. at 795.
121. Earlier, in 1974, two other seabed mining consortia were organized,
the Kennecott Copper group and the Deepsea Ventures organization.
122. 121 CoNG. REc. S 6094 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1975).
123. San Diego Union, Oct. 23, 1975, § A, at 11, col. 1.
124. Smith, Record Probe Set Into Atlantic Floor, San Diego Union, Nov.
16, 1975, § B, at 1, col. 2.
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has become an international venture. English, Japanese, Russian,
and West German agencies are helping to finance the Project, with
France to join shortly.
Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Studied as an Alternative to
Plutonium Breeder Reactors: In June of 1975, Rogert Douglass of
TRW Systems, a California-based engineering firm, announced that
ocean thermal energy may be a viable alternative to plutonium-
based powerplants. Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Units,
consisting of floating platforms in the ocean, use the difference in
temperature between surface water and deep water to generate
electricity. Ocean thermal energy conversion was developed in
response to widespread concern regarding hazards of nuclear power.
Costs and energy output considerations also played an important
role in its development. TRW estimates research and development
costs of between $500 million and $1 billion. In contrast, the
plutonim breeder's research and development costs are estimated
at $10 billion. Estimated electrical output of ocean thermal energy
conversion is expected to be 30,000 megawatts by 1990, with a
resource potential of 700,000 megawatts in the Gulf Coast area
alone. Nuclear powerplants currently produce about 30,000 mega-
watts.
The technology needed for the development of Ocean Thermal
Energy Units is available now. The only obstacle to commercial
success lies in the development of an aluminum condenser to
replace the more expensive titanium model currently being con-
sidered.125
SHIPPING
New United Nations Draft Convention On Shipping: In 1969, the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law created a
Working Group on International Legislation on Shipping, and
charged it with revising international rules relating to bills of
lading. After years of work, the Working Group produced a draft
entitled "Convention on the Carriage of Goods By Sea" at its eighth
session, held from February 10 through 21, 1975. Alternative drafts
of articles were included in those cases where the 21 nations com-
posing the Working Group could not agree. Among the draft's pro-
125. 121 CONG. REC. E 3444 (daily ed. June 23, 1975).
visions were those covering limits and duration of carriers' liability,
shippers' liability, arbitration, preselected forum, and definitions of
terms. The draft will be considered at the March-April 1976
session of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law.126
President Ford Signs the Deepwater Port Act of 1974: Deepwater
ports, or superports, are offshore oil transportation facilities de-
signed to handle supertankers ranging in size from 200,000 to
500,000 dead-weight tons, up to 12 times the capacity of conven-
tional tankers. Although there are a wide range of offshore termi-
nal designs, the one most widely used (which has also been pro-
posed for installation off the United States), is the single point
mooring buoy (SPM). These SPM terminals usually consist of
mooring buoys which are anchored to the ocean floor and feed into
submarine pipelines to shore.127
Proponents argue such facilities offer a cheap means of transport-
ing imported petroleum supplies without adverse environmental
impacts. They say the use of supertankers and deepwater ports
would reduce risks of grounding, collisions and oil spills. However,
environmentalists fear use of submerged pipelines and supertankers
will increase the likelihood of oil spillage.1 28
On January 3, 1975, President Ford signed into law the Deepwater
Port Act of 1974.129 The Act, designed to regulate deepwater
facilities located off United States shores beyond the territorial sea,
forbids the Secretary of Transportation from issuing deepwater
port licenses without first determining that the construction and
operation of the port is in the best interests of the nation and that
the facility does not interfere with adjacent states' coastal manage-
ment plans. 30 The applicant is also required to provide data on
oil-spill prevention measures, cleanup capability requirements, con-
struction standards and operational constraints.' 3 ' Review by the
EPA is mandatory. If the Secretary of Transportation approves
the application, a license may be issued for up to 20 years, with
renewal periods not exceeding ten years each. 3 2
126. 12 U.N. MoNTHLY CHRON., March 1975, at 46.
127. S. REP. No. 93-1217, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1974).
128. See generally Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea V: A
Synopsis, 11 SAN DIEaO L. REV. 691, 722 (1974).
129. Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1501 (1975).
130. Id. § 1503 (c) (6).
131. Proposed Dep't of Trans. Reg. §§ 148, 149, 150, 40 Fed. Reg. 19956
(1975).
132. Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1503 (h) (1975).
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The new law also prohibits discharge of oil, within a safety zone
of 500 meters, from any vessel which has received oil from another
vessel or the deepwater facility.13 3 Civil penalties are set at a maxi-
mum of $10,000 for each violation. 3 4 In addition, the owner and
operator of the vessel are jointly liable without regard to fault for
all cleanup costs and damages up to $20 million or $150 per gross
ton of the vessel involved, whichever is less. 3 5 Failure to
promptly report the discharge can result in maximum fines of
$10,000 or one year in jail, or both.13 6
Three deepwater ports, now in advanced planning stages, may
be operational by mid-1978. They are the Louisiana Offshore Oil
Port (LOOP), located about 18 miles off the Louisiana coast at
Bayou Lafourche; SEADOCK, 30 miles south of Freeport, Texas,
and AMERPORT, 35 miles south of the Mississippi-Alabama state
line. LOOP and SEADOCK are oil company consortia proposals,
while AMERPORT is a joint Mississippi-Alabama project. These
three deepwater ports, by servicing less than ten supertankers,
would be able to handle approximately half of the United States
daily crude oil requirements.
37
Suez Canal Reopens: On June 5, 1975, Egyptian President Anwar
Sadat proclaimed the opening of the Suez Canal to international
shipping "as a gift to the world" and as a step towards Middle East
peace. 38 He led a procession of ships from several countries
along the 103-mile canal, the first ships to use the route since
it was closed by the Arab-Israeli War of 1967.
Britain, France, the United States and the U.S.S.R. contributed
to the formidable task of preparing the waterway for safe naviga-
tion. 39 Twenty-eight tons of wrecked ships, tanks, and airplanes,
and 7,500 pieces of unexploded ordinance had to be cleared from
the lane, along with 700,000 mines and other explosives which had
133. Id. § 1593.
134. Id. § 1593 (a) (2).
135. Id. § 1593(d).
136. Id. § 1593(b).
137. 5 BNA ENvin REP. CuRRENT DvELoPAmTxs 1510 (1975).
138. L.A. Times, June 6, 1975, pt. 1, at 1, col. 6.
139. The cost of the United States contribution was estimated at $30 mil-
lion. Wal Street J., March 31, 1975, at 6, col. 4 (city ed.). (The Wail
Street Journal is bound in the eastern edition.)
to be removed from the banks. 140 Then 15 freighters, trapped in
the canal for eight years by the Six-Day War, had to be removed. 41
A work-force of 13,000 is now required for the canal's various opera-
tions.
In the last full year of operation before closing in 1967, 14
percent of the world's shipping moved through the canal.' 42 Al-
though Egypt hopes to increase the volume of cargo moving
through the canal and to double the pre-1967 annual revenues
received from the canal tolls, shipping experts doubt that an
increase will soon occur for two reasons. First, although the canal
route can shorten a voyage from the Persian Gulf to Northern
Europe by 12 days, 143 many shippers feel that it is nevertheless
more expensive than the longer route. One factor is that Egypt has
doubled the tolls over the 1967 rate. The rate is figured in "Special
Drawing Rights," which the International Monetary Fund orig-
inated to avoid currency fluctuations. Another factor is insurance
costs. Groups such as the American Cargo War Risk Reinsurance
Exchange imposed a surcharge of as much as .25 percent on Suez
shipping. However, this was dropped in September 1975, because
of relaxed dangers of Middle East war.144
The second reason for experts doubting a raise in Suez shipments
is the increasing size of tankers being used in international trade.
Before the canal closed, 70 percent of the ships passing through
it were carrying crude oil or petroleum products. 45 However,
because tankers have been built much larger since 1967, only 27
percent of all tankers currently used in world shipping can pass
through the canal. 146 The Suez Canal Authority plans to enlarge
the canal from its current capacity of a 38 foot draft and total ship
weight of 60,000 tons to 53 feet and 150,000 tons within three years
and 67 feet and 260,000 tons in six years. 147
In the first two months of operation after reopening, 1,065 vessels
had used the canal, paying over $25 million in tolls. The average
140. Tanner, Egyptians Reopen Canal Amid Pomp, N.Y. Times, June 6,
1975, at 9, col. 5; Morse, After Eight Years, World's Shipping Is Moving
Through Suez Canal, SimTsoxNu , Oct. 1975, at 60, 61.
141. Several vessels had changed ownership many times, and most insur-
ance claims were long ago settled. Foisie, Suez Canal's Ships Sail to Free-
dom, L.A. Times, May 8, 1975, pt. I, at 12, col. 1.
142. Wall Street J., April 2, 1975, at 36, col. 2 (city ed.). (The Wall
Street Journal is bound in the eastern edition.)
143. Tanner, supra note 140, at col. 1.
144. Wall Street J., Sept. 8, 1975, at 7, col. 1 (city ed.). (The Wall Street
Journal is bound in the eastern edition.)
145. Wall Street J., supra note 142 (city ed.). (The Wall Street Journal
is bound in the eastern edition.)
146. Morse, supra note 140, at 66.
147. Id.
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of 20 to 25 ships per day during this period was well below the
pre-1967 average of 63. Countries of Western Europe, Eastern Africa,
Asia, and particularly the Persian Gulf, are expected to receive the
most commercial gain from the reopening.148 The U.S.S.R is
expected to benefit more than other nations militarily because the
canal provides a much shorter route from its Indian Ocean bases
to the Black Sea. 49 During the first months of operation, Russia
was the heaviest user of the canal.
Panama Canal Negotiations Continue: In September of 1973,
United States Ambassador-at-Large Ellsworth Bunker and Pana-
ma's Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack began a new round of
negotiations aimed at replacing the 1903 Hay-Bunan Viaillia Treaty,
which granted the United States perpetual sovereignty over the 550
square mile Panama Canal Zone.1 0 This marked the third time
since 1964 that the United States and Panama have attempted to
work out an agreement which would give Panama greater control
over the Canal.15 '
The Panamanian government is seeking to eliminate the per-
petuity concept by proposing a new treaty with a maximum length
of 25 years. Ambassador Bunker has agreed to accept the 25-year
jurisdictional termination date, but has demanded a 50-year United
States right to defend the Canal Zone. Panama also wants a
reduction in the size and location of the land and water areas
devoted to the canal's operation and defense until it resumes con-
trol of the canal. 52 Although treaty opponents see this as a threat
to the United States military and economic security, backers of the
negotiations contend the military value of the canal is marginal, at
best, given its vulnerability to sabotage and unsophisticated weap-
onry. Furthermore, they point out only about ten percent of the
total United States trade passes through the canal, with an effect
of less than one percent of the nation's gross national product. 53
148. N.Y. Times, May 4, 1975, at 11, coL 1.
149. Tanner, supra note 140, at col. 2.
150. Tharp, Treaty Troubles: Panama Negotiations Could Affeet More
Than The Canal Zone, Wall Street J., Aug. 21, 1975, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.).(The Wall Street Journal is bound in the eastern edition.)
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Leeds, The Canal Problem: A Way Out for Ford, L.A. Times, Oct. 1,
1975, pt. I, at 7, col. 1.
The 1975 session of the talks was marred by congressional
opposition. In March, 37 Senators, enough to block the necessary
two-thirds needed for ratification, endorsed a resolution opposing
any giveaway of United States sovereignty. Later, in June of 1975,
the House approved a measure aimed at cutting federal funds "to
negotiate the surrender or relinquishment of United States rights
in the Panama Canal."' 54
However, the attitude of Congress changed in October of 1975,
when the House adopted a motion to recede from its June position
by a vote of 212 to 201. The House then went on to approve a
congressional resolution calling on the Administration to protect
United States interests in any new Canal pact. The State Depart-
ment viewed the resolution as a major step in giving United States
negotiators authority to continue serious treaty discussions.'5 "
First Session on the Establishment of an International Maritime
Satellite System Held: Representatives of 43 nations attended the
first session of the International Conference on the Establishment
of an International Maritime Satellite System held April 23 through
May 9, 1975, in London. The purpose of the Conference was to in-
vestigate the establishment of a more effective and capable mari-
time communications system. The delegates also considered com-
munications developments in the fields of maritime safety, both in
the area of navigation and response to distress.1 6
United States and Canadian Officials Hold West Coast Tanker
Traffic Talks: Discussions between the United States and Canada
concerning west coast tanker traffic were held in Washington, D.C.
on January 17, 1975. The talks focused on the environmental prob-
lems of marine transit and coastal refining in the Puget Sound-
Juan de Fuca area.
The two countries emphasized the need for joint-vessel traffic
management systems in the area. A voluntary traffic separation
plan to take effect on March 1, 1975, was announced. Officials at
the conference also reviewed the status of proposed offshore tanker
routes between Alaska and the West Coast.157
SOVEREIGNTY
Iceland Adopts 200-Mile Fishery Limits: On July 15, 1975,
154. Id.
155. Binder, House Stops Bid to Block Panama Pact, N.Y. Times, Oct.
8, 1975, at 2, coL 3.
156. 121 CoNG. REc. E 4091 (daily ed. July 23, 1975).
157. 72 DEP'T STATE BImuL. 272 (1975).
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Iceland's Ministry of Fisheries issued regulations' 58 which estab-
lished a 200-mile fishery resource zone. The limits were drawn 200
nautical miles seaward of baselines running between designated
points, except in the cases where Greenland and the Faeroes were
closer than 400 nautical miles, in which cases the limits were set
midway. Within the zone, all foreign fishing is prohibited, and
certain Icelandic fishing is prohibited during specified periods. The
regulations were to take effect October 15, 1975.
Mexico's President Moves to Create 200-Mile Economic Zone:
On November 5, 1975, Mexico's President Luis Echeverria Alvarez
sent to the Mexican National Congress a decree establishing a 200-
mile economic zone off that nation's coast. The decree would give
Mexico full control over all natural resources and artificial struc-
tures, with corresponding antipollution and conservation duties,
within the 772,000 square mile area. Foreign State freedom of navi-
gation and freedom to keep undersea cables is included in the
economic zone concept. If the Mexican Congress approves the
decree, it will be published in the official gazzette, and will take
effect 120 days thereafter. 59
United States to Have Sovereign Rights Over Atlantic Continen-
tal Shelf: United States sovereignty over the Atlantic Continental
Shelf was established on March 17, 1975, when the United States
Supreme Court held that the United States, to the exclusion of 13
Atlantic coastal states, was entitled to exercise sovereign rights for
purposes of exploration and exploitation of resources on the shelf.."
The United States sovereignty extends over the seabed and subsoil
lying in the zone from three miles seaward of the coastline to the
edge of the shelf. The Court stated that the states held rights to
the three-mile zone adjacent to the coast only because of statutory
grant.
The Court found to be without merit claims by 12 of the states
that they had acquired sovereign rights from the Crown countries
which they had not relinquished when joining the Union. Affirm-
ing prior decisions involving California, Texas and Louisiana, the
Court determined that dominion over the coastal sea was first ob-
158. 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1282 (1975).
159. San Diego Union, Nov. 6, 1975, § A, at 21, col. 7.
160. United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975). See also Recent Devel-
opments, supra note 1, at 698.
tained by the national government, not the colonies or the states.
Whatever interest the states might have had prior to statehood, the
Court said, as a matter of constitutional law, paramount rights
would exist in the federal government because of its jurisdiction
over foreign commerce, foreign affairs, and national defense.
Further, when Congress by the Submerged Lands Act of
1953161 gave rights in the three-mile marginal sea to the states,
this grant was not in repudiation of federal authority over the mar-
ginal seabed, but rather in exercise of that authority. That Con-
gress acted in confirmation of national sovereignty is evident, the
Court reasoned, from the Act's express reservation of United States
jurisdiction and control over the continental shelf lying outside the
three-mile zone.
The Court also noted that major legislation and substantial
commercial activity had been founded upon the principle of
national sovereignty in this zone, and that neither the states nor
their putative lessees had been misled.
Lower Cook Inlet Held to Belong to United States: The United
States Supreme Court denied Alaska's claim of sovereignty over
the submerged lands of Cook Inlet's lower bay on June 23, 1975.102
The basis of Alaska's claim was the Submerged Lands Act,10
which confirmed to the states ownership of lands within three miles
of the "coastline." The Act's definition of "coastline" includes the
seaward limit of "inland waters.' 0 4 Applying the definitions of the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the
Supreme Court stated that since the lower portion of Cook Inlet is
over 24 miles wide, it could only be considered an "inland water"
if shown to be an "historic bay." Although this term was left
undefined by the Convention, the Court recognized three significant
factors: an exercise of authority over the area by the claimant, the
continuity of that exercise, and acquiescence by foreign States.
Evidence offered by Alaska was reviewed by the Court in the order
of exercises of dominion by Russia, the United States, and Alaska
during their respective periods of sovereignty.
As to the Russian period, the Court found first that the presence
of four settlements on the shore was little indication of Russian
dominion over the inlet's "vast expanse of waters."'1 5  Second,
161. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1970).
162. United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184 (1975), rev'g 497 F.2d 1155 (9th
Cir. 1974). See also Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 697.
163. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1970).
164. Id. § 1301 (c).
165. United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 190 (1975).
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the fact that a Russian fur trader fired a cannon at an English
vessel when it attempted to enter the inlet was held insignificant
unless shown to be the act of a government official, and not incon-
sistent with the position of the United States that Alaska's sov-
ereignty extends only three miles. Third, a ukase of the Tsar pro-
hibiting foreign vessels from a 100-mile Alaskan coastal zone was
considered to be little demonstration of authority since it was with-
drawn when the United States and England protested.
Five instances wherein the United States exerted dominion in its
period of sovereignty were also discussed. These included three
Acts of Congress, one executive order, and one instance in which
charts were drawn by the United States Bureau of Fisheries em-
ployees to aid Canadian delegates after discussions concerning a
proposed United States-Canadian agreement regulating salmon
fishing in the North Pacific. The Supreme Court pointed out that
the purpose behind all of these actions was fish and wildlife man-
agement. Since the exercises of authority offered as evidence must
be commensurate with the nature of the title claimed, the Court
reasoned, to establish lower Cook Inlet as an "historic bay," Alaska
must show that the United States attempted to exclude all foreign
vessels and navigation from the area. As a matter of law, the Court
held "historic bay" status could not be established solely by evi-
dence of enforcement of fish and game regulations. Since four of
the five instances cited did not distinguish American from foreign
vessels, none of the four was a sufficient exercise of authority. One
of the congressional acts cited was aimed at foreign vessels, but
the Court also found this inadequate because the act did not by
its terms apply to waters outside the three-mile limit, and because
there was no evidence that it was ever enforced against foreign
vessels.
The Court found the alleged exertions of dominion during the
period of United States sovereignty inadequate for a further reason.
The third factor relevant to the "historic bay" determination was
the acquiescence by foreign States in the exercise of authority. Dis-
agreeing with the lower court, the Supreme Court stated that in
this case, without a showing that foreign States recognized the
actions as claims of territorial sovereignty, the failure of any States
to protest could not prove acquiescence.
During the period of Alaskan sovereignty, Alaskan law enforce-
ment officials had seized two vessels of a Japansese fishing fleet
which had sailed into the inlet and left ten days earlier. This
occurred more than three miles from the coastline, and was thus
clearly an exercise of authority to exclude foreign vessels. Never-
theless, the Court found the seizure insufficient to establish sover-
eignty over Cook Inlet, for three reasons. First, Alaska had taken
no action until the vessels were 75 miles from the bay, and the
charges did not relate to the entrance into it. Also, the Court
reasoned that since the United States government took no position
at the time, it would not be a clear claim to sovereignty from
Japan's point of view. Finally, the Court found the element of
acquiescence totally lacking; rather, Japan had formally objected
to the United States.
Thus, the evidence produced from the three periods of sover-
eignty was found insufficient to prove the requisite exercise of
authority. Since Alaska failed to establish lower Cook Inlet as an
"historic bay," the lower bay would not be included within the
Alaskan coastline.
Louisiana Coastline Established: On March 17, 1975, in a further
development in the long line of proceedings between the United
States and Gulf of Mexico coastal States, the United States
Supreme Court ordered the United States and the State of Louisi-
ana to prepare for the Court a decree establishing Louisiana's
coastline for purposes of determining the extent of its territorial
waters. 66 The parties subsequently reached an agreement and
returned to the Court, and their proposed decree was accepted
in a supplemental decree of June 16, 1975.107
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166. United States v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 529 (1975).
167. United States v. Louisiana, 422 U.S. 13 (1975).
